4.5 Military Bases and Expansion

What would happen to existing military bases?

Key military bases — including Faslane/Coulport, RAF Lossiemouth, and other significant sites — would be retained and, where strategically useful, expanded under the partnership model with the United Kingdom and NATO. Scotland would actively seek to host additional Alliance or bilateral capabilities that strengthen North Atlantic and High North security. Local economic benefit and community engagement would be built into base agreements.

Bases are where strategy meets concrete geography. The decisions to host the UK nuclear deterrent under treaty, to seek full NATO membership on a high-effort contribution path aligned with the Alliance’s 5% plan, and to build Scottish forces around maritime and northern roles only hold if the infrastructure that supports those roles is kept, modernised and, where it adds effect, grown. Closure or drift of Faslane, Coulport or Lossiemouth would undercut the entire defence package for no strategic gain and at high employment cost.

The main design choice is selective retention and expansion driven by Alliance utility, not preservation of every site for its own sake. The main constraints are fiscal (infrastructure competes inside a demanding defence budget), dependence on UK and Ally agreement for shared or hosted missions, and community consent managed through transparent local benefit and environmental standards. Continuity of operations during the transition is a design requirement so that deterrence, surveillance and employment do not face a cliff-edge on Independence Day.

Military bases are the physical layer of the defence design set out in the preceding sections. The decision to continue hosting the UK nuclear deterrent under a long-term treaty-based agreement, the pursuit of full NATO membership on a contribution path aligned with a 5% of GDP defence effort, and the construction of Scottish armed forces specialised for maritime, anti-submarine, air surveillance and northern roles all depend on the retention, modernisation and selective expansion of the infrastructure that makes those roles possible. Closure or unmanaged drift of Faslane, Coulport or RAF Lossiemouth would weaken deterrence, damage Alliance posture in the North Atlantic and the approaches to the GIUK gap, and destroy skilled employment without strategic gain. Retention is therefore the baseline; selective expansion where it adds Alliance effect is the policy; and an active posture toward hosting additional NATO or bilateral capabilities that fit Scotland’s geographic strengths is the forward contribution.

This section sets out the approach to existing key bases, the criteria for expansion, the partnership model under which shared or UK-linked sites would operate, the integration of local economic benefit and community engagement into base agreements, and the relationship between base policy and the wider force structure and fiscal framework. It does so without claiming that every existing site will be preserved regardless of utility, without treating bases as regional subsidies detached from strategy, and without softening the fiscal competition that infrastructure spending faces inside a demanding defence budget. Continuity of operations during the transition is a design requirement. Deterrence, surveillance and employment must not face a legal or practical cliff-edge on Independence Day.

The design choice is role-driven. Bases that support the maritime and northern contribution are retained and, where expansion improves effect, grown. Bases that do not serve the strategy are reviewed on their merits. Under a defence effort aligned with the NATO 5% plan, the state has greater capacity to invest in priority infrastructure; that capacity does not obligate it to fund low-value estate.

Current Position and Legal/Institutional Baseline

Scotland already hosts some of the most important military infrastructure in the northern Euro-Atlantic area. HM Naval Base Clyde at Faslane and the Royal Naval Armaments Depot at Coulport form the operational heart of the UK Continuous At-Sea Deterrent and constitute a major naval complex supporting the Submarine Service. The site employs more than 6,500 military and civilian personnel and is the focus of a £15.1 billion transformation programme over the next decade under Project Royal Oak — the largest element of a wider £26 billion naval bases modernisation and the most significant investment in UK naval infrastructure since the end of the Cold War. RAF Lossiemouth is a central hub for maritime patrol, air defence and northern air operations, hosting Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and contributing to the northern region's air policing and surveillance posture. Other army, navy and support locations contribute to training, logistics and regional presence.

Under the present constitutional arrangements, these bases operate under UK sovereignty and UK command. Independence would transfer sovereignty over the territory to Scotland. The physical infrastructure, workforce, investment programmes already underway, and strategic geography would remain. The legal and institutional task is to re-base the continued operation of these sites on agreements that respect Scottish sovereignty, guarantee the operational requirements of the missions based there, and provide for consultation, economic benefit and environmental standards. For Faslane and Coulport, the primary instrument is the long-term nuclear basing treaty already described. For other sites with significant UK or shared activity, the instruments are wider status-of-forces and partnership agreements. Purely Scottish force elements would operate under national command arrangements.

The international baseline is the normal practice of allied basing. Host-nation sovereignty is retained; operational rights required for agreed missions are defined in treaty or agreement form; community, environmental and economic provisions are increasingly standard. Scotland would not be inventing the concept; it would be applying it to the specific geography and infrastructure of the northern flank.

Mechanism and Delivery

The retention mechanism combines the nuclear basing treaty for Faslane and Coulport, wider partnership and status-of-forces agreements with the United Kingdom for other shared or UK-linked sites, and Scottish national command arrangements for elements of the Scottish armed forces. Early political clarity that key bases will be retained under these arrangements is required to protect workforce confidence, private investment and Alliance planning. Parallel negotiation of the detailed agreements would run through the transition period. Interim operating arrangements would ensure continuity of missions and employment from Independence Day until the formal agreements enter into force.

Expansion would be considered where it improves the ability to monitor and protect the approaches to the North Atlantic and the GIUK gap; strengthens anti-submarine warfare, maritime patrol or air surveillance capacity; enhances Scotland’s ability to support High North and northern-flank operations; or makes better use of existing geography, infrastructure and skills. Decisions would be driven by strategic utility and Alliance need, not by a desire to maximise the number of facilities. Under the 5% defence effort path there is more room to fund infrastructure that deepens readiness in priority missions; governance of the defence budget must still prevent estate spending from crowding out force personnel, training and equipment.

Hosting additional Alliance or bilateral capabilities would be pursued actively but case by case. Scotland would offer strategically valuable real estate, infrastructure and political willingness; Allies would gain improved posture in a critical area. Possible categories include further maritime patrol or anti-submarine assets, enhanced surveillance or command-and-control nodes, training and exercise infrastructure for northern and cold-weather operations, and logistics or forward-support facilities that improve Alliance reinforcement and sustainment. Each decision would be taken under sovereign agreements consistent with Scottish law, community interests and the overall defence plan. Hosting is a treaty and agreement task, not an open invitation without terms.

Local economic benefit and community engagement would be written into the agreements. Provisions would address protecting and developing local employment and skills, opportunities for local and Scottish suppliers, structured consultation on developments that affect surrounding areas, and environmental standards and mitigation. Bases should be a source of high-quality economic activity and confidence between the armed forces and local communities. Economic benefit is a real policy objective; it is not a substitute for strategic rationale.

Continuity Design

Continuity of operations at key bases is a design requirement parallel to continuity of the Continuous At-Sea Deterrent itself. Deterrence, maritime and air surveillance, and the protection of critical infrastructure must not face a cliff-edge on Independence Day. Interim operating arrangements, agreed in parallel with the wider settlement, would preserve UK operational control where required under the nuclear mission and would maintain essential Scottish and shared tasks under clear interim command. Workforce terms, security clearances and industrial contracts would continue or transfer under arrangements that protect employment and skills.

Continuity of Scottish sovereignty is secured by residual title and by the requirement that all basing and status-of-forces arrangements operate under Scottish law subject only to the specific operational rights agreed. Continuity of community and environmental protections is secured by writing consultation, economic benefit and environmental standards into the agreements from the outset rather than treating them as afterthoughts. Early political clarity that key sites will be retained, along with alignment of Scottish policy with the multi-decade transformation programmes already underway at Clyde and elsewhere, supports continuity of investment.

The design therefore avoids both a disruptive closure timetable and an informal basing arrangement that leaves sovereignty, community and operational issues unresolved. Operations, employment and legal authority continue without a gap while the formal agreements are brought into force.

Constraints and Trade-offs

Legal constraints

Basing and status-of-forces agreements are international instruments that must be compatible with the interim and permanent Scottish constitutions, NATO requirements, and domestic environmental, planning, and employment law. Residual sovereignty must remain Scottish; operational rights must be defined with precision sufficient for the missions based at each site. Criminal jurisdiction interfaces, emergency powers and security regimes require careful drafting. Ratification and implementing legislation introduce procedural steps and potential delay. These constraints are demanding but manageable through the treaty-making and legislative capacity already required by the wider framework.

Fiscal constraints

Base running costs, estate modernisation and any expansion sit within the defence budget aligned with the 5% path and inside the medium-term fiscal plan. They compete directly with force personnel, training, equipment and stockpiles. Poorly prioritised estate spending is a classic route to hollow readiness; defence budget governance must prevent infrastructure from crowding out the people and materiel that make bases effective. Under the opening fiscal position, the competition is acute. Expansion is therefore selective and role-driven; it is not an open-ended programme of estate growth. Local economic benefit is real and measurable, yet it does not justify retaining or expanding sites that fail the strategic test.

Operational constraints

Retaining operating bases is far more feasible than relocating the missions they support. Expansion and new hosted capabilities depend on funding, planning consent, Ally demand and negotiated agreements. Nuclear safety, security regimes and the exacting standards of the Continuous At-Sea Deterrent impose operational constraints that any agreement must respect. Coordination between UK force protection, Scottish forces and civil authorities requires clear protocols. Continuity of investment under existing UK programmes depends on early clarity that the sites will remain available under agreed terms; uncertainty freezes private and public capital.

Political constraints

Long-term nuclear and conventional basing will face domestic political contention in some communities and political circles. Sustaining the policy requires consistent explanation of the strategic rationale, visible local economic benefit, robust environmental standards and genuine consultation mechanisms. On the UK and Ally side, any perception that operational rights are incomplete or that review clauses create unacceptable uncertainty will generate resistance. The partnership model — residual sovereignty Scottish, operational rights defined and durable, community and environmental provisions explicit — is the instrument designed to manage that tension. Additional hosting is demand-led and negotiated; it is not assumed.

Time constraints

Early political clarity on retention is required to protect the workforce and the investment programmes already under way. Negotiation of the nuclear basing treaty and of wider partnership agreements must proceed in parallel with the independence settlement so that interim operating arrangements can bridge to full entry into force without a gap. Planning, consent and construction lead times for any expansion mean that physical growth occurs over years. A credibility gap between declared retention policy and delayed formal agreements would itself generate uncertainty. The transition timetable must therefore treat base agreements as a critical-path item alongside the force-structure and accession workstreams.

Consistency with the Wider Framework

Base policy implements the nuclear hosting decision and the treaty-based legal agreement that gives it effect. It supports the NATO membership and contribution model, including the 5% effort path, by keeping and developing the infrastructure required for maritime, anti-submarine, air surveillance and northern roles. It aligns with the force structure specialised for those same roles and creates sustained demand for the defence industrial base on the Clyde and elsewhere. It fits the partnership model of post-independence UK relations: residual Scottish sovereignty, operational cooperation under treaty, and equal status rather than residual dependence.

Base spending sits inside the fiscal rules and the medium-term fiscal plan; it is a prioritised claim that still competes with other defence and non-defence needs. It does not alter the sterlingisation monetary regime or the borders and movement framework. Constitutional continuity supplies the authority to enter basing and status-of-forces agreements. Continuity of employment, skills and community economic activity aligns with the wider continuity design for public services and regional economies. In every case, bases are the physical expression of the coherent defence package, not a separate estate policy.

Hardest Critiques and Direct Responses

Feasibility

Retaining operating bases is operationally far more feasible than relocating the missions they support. The infrastructure, workforce and investment programmes already exist. Expansion and new hosted capabilities are feasible over a multi-year horizon if funding, planning consent, Ally demand and negotiated agreements are prioritised inside the defence plan. International practice demonstrates that allied basing under treaty arrangements is a standard and workable instrument. Feasibility falls only if political clarity is delayed, if agreements are left informal, or if estate spending is allowed to crowd out force readiness.

Cost and fiscal burden

Base running costs, modernisation and expansion are real claims on the defence budget. Under a 5% path, capacity increases, yet competition for personnel, training and equipment remains sharp. Poorly prioritised estate spending hollows readiness; the framework subordinates base investment to the same readiness test that governs the rest of the defence budget. Local economic benefit is a genuine and concentrated gain, particularly in the regions that host the major sites. Still, it does not justify retaining or expanding facilities that fail the strategic test. The alternative cost of closure — loss of deterrence contribution, Alliance posture and skilled employment — is substantially higher.

Dependence on agreement

Dependence on the United Kingdom is high for Faslane and Coulport and for any shared use of other sites. Partnership agreements require UK consent. Adversarial negotiation could delay formalisation; operational continuity arrangements would still be sought so that missions and jobs do not stop. Hosting additional non-UK Allied capabilities diversifies dependence over time and is therefore part of the forward policy. Contingency planning accepts that some delay is possible and prioritises interim continuity and early political clarity to limit the damage.

Transition risk

Legal uncertainty over status of forces, security of tenure for civilian staff, or investment freezes during negotiation are material risks. Mitigation is early, unambiguous political clarity that key bases will be retained under formal agreements; parallel negotiation of the nuclear treaty and wider partnership instruments; interim operating arrangements that preserve missions and employment; and explicit workforce communications that reduce the perception of a cliff-edge. A further risk is community opposition that undermines the political sustainability of long-term basing; mitigation is visible local benefit, robust environmental standards and genuine consultation mechanisms written into the agreements from the start.

Alternatives (status quo and previous proposals)

Rapid closure or rundown of Faslane, Coulport, or Lossiemouth undermines deterrence, Alliance posture, and employment, and is rejected. Preserving every site indefinitely regardless of role wastes resources and confuses strategy; it is rejected in favour of role-driven retention and review. Refusing additional Allied hosting on principle forgoes a major contribution channel and economic opportunity; the design rejects this in favour of case-by-case hosting under sovereign agreements. Informal basing without treaty or partnership agreements leaves sovereignty, community and operational issues unresolved and is rejected. The design chooses selective retention and expansion driven by Alliance utility, formal agreements that respect sovereignty, and explicit local benefit and environmental standards.

Political and public credibility

The claim most likely to be called unrealistic is that communities will accept long-term nuclear and conventional basing, or that Allies will fund expansion on Scottish soil, or that estate costs will not crowd out force readiness under fiscal pressure. The precise answer is that hosting is a stated strategic choice with treaty safeguards, economic and environmental chapters, and structured consultation; that additional hosting is demand-led and negotiated rather than assumed; and that base spending is subordinated to the same readiness test as the rest of the defence budget under a high national effort path. Credibility is measured by operating continuity, signed agreements and visible local benefit — not by maps with ever more pins or by promises detached from the fiscal and strategic framework. Readers who prefer closure or a lower base footprint are invited to evaluate the framework on that clear disagreement.

Position Summarised

Key bases, including Faslane/Coulport and RAF Lossiemouth, would be retained and, where they strengthen North Atlantic and High North security, expanded. Scotland would actively seek to host additional NATO or bilateral capabilities that fit its geographic advantages. Arrangements would operate under a partnership model with the United Kingdom that respects Scottish sovereignty while delivering operational certainty for the missions based there.

Base agreements would include local economic benefit, skills development, community consultation, and environmental standards. Base policy is the practical expression of the wider defence posture: a northern maritime Ally that keeps and develops the infrastructure needed to make its contribution real under a defence effort aligned with the NATO 5% plan. Sites that do not serve strategy would be reviewed on their merits. Continuity of operations and employment during the transition is a design requirement.

Conclusion

Bases are not a separate policy from forces, NATO membership and the nuclear agreement — they are the physical layer of the same design. Scotland would keep the key northern and maritime sites, expand them when expansion adds Alliance effect, invite further Allied presence on sovereign terms, and write local benefit and environmental standards into the agreements that govern them.

That approach protects deterrence, employment and contribution. It rejects both symbolic clearance of the Clyde and unfocused estate maximalism. Under a defence effort aligned with the NATO 5% plan, infrastructure investment is affordable only if it remains tied to readiness in the roles Scotland has chosen. The next sections turn from fixed infrastructure to the intelligence, cyber and industrial capabilities that make bases and forces effective in a contested northern theatre.

This analysis forms part of People’s Future Scotland: The Independence Debate, a non-party framework examining the practical design of independence. Each section is written to withstand professional scrutiny and to prioritise mechanism, constraint and continuity over aspiration.