6. European Union and International Relations

International posture tests the definition of independence in public. This framework is explicit: Scotland would not apply to join the European Union. Independence is pursued so that the major decisions affecting Scotland are made in Scotland by institutions accountable to the people who live here. Rejoining the EU would transfer significant powers over trade, regulation, fisheries, state aid and related areas to Brussels. That is incompatible with the core purpose of independence as defined here.

These positions keep decision-making power in Scotland. By choosing not to rejoin the EU, Scotland avoids a new layer of external control while remaining free to build pragmatic, interest-based relationships with the EU, the rest of the UK and the wider world. Membership of the core global institutions is standard and achievable for any independent state that meets the basic criteria of statehood. Trade starts from WTO rules; treaties are succeeded to by choice, not by automatic inheritance; diplomacy is focused where Scottish interests are greatest; and aid policy is set in Holyrood inside the fiscal rules.

All answers are achievable under standard international practice for a newly independent state. None require EU membership. None pretend that non-membership is cost-free for EU market access. The priority trading relationship remains the rest of the UK; the EU relationship is selective and subordinate to Holyrood control.

6.1 Explicit decision not to seek EU membership

No. Scotland would not apply to join the European Union. Independence is defined as locating major decision-making power in Scottish institutions accountable to the people who live here. EU membership would transfer significant powers over trade, regulation, fisheries, state aid and related areas to Brussels, and is therefore incompatible with that purpose. Scotland would maintain independent, interest-based relationships with the EU and its member states. A future mandate for a different EU relationship would be a separate democratic choice; it is not part of this independence proposition.

6.2 Relationship with the Single Market

As a non-member, Scotland would not have automatic access to the EU Single Market or Customs Union. Trade with the EU would begin on WTO terms while Scotland negotiated its own bilateral agreements. The rest of the UK would remain the priority trading relationship. Any future agreement with the EU would be judged only by whether it served Scottish interests and preserved full policy control in Holyrood. Scotland would seek access where advantageous; it would not trade away control to obtain it. Costs of reduced automatic EU access are acknowledged and accepted.

6.3 WTO membership and trade agreement succession

Scotland would apply to join the WTO as a new member under Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement. Accession is a negotiated process that typically takes several years; Scotland would seek to accelerate it by building on the UK’s existing schedules where possible. Existing UK bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements would not transfer automatically; Scotland would negotiate succession or new agreements, seeking continuity arrangements during the transition to limit disruption. WTO membership is the rules-based baseline for independent trade policy.

6.4 Membership of UN, IMF, World Bank, OECD etc.

Yes. Scotland would seek membership of the United Nations, the IMF, the World Bank, the OECD and other standard international organisations as a normal attribute of statehood. UN membership proceeds by Security Council recommendation and General Assembly vote. IMF and World Bank membership follows established procedures for new states. OECD accession is by invitation and negotiation once standards are met. These memberships are routine and fully achievable. Sequencing would prioritise foundational memberships; quota and participation costs would be planned within the fiscal framework.

6.5 Diplomatic recognition and embassy network

Scotland would seek diplomatic recognition immediately after independence, beginning with the United Kingdom and major allies. UK recognition would be the pivotal early step and would strongly influence others. Scotland would build a focused network of embassies and high commissions prioritising the rest of the UK, major trading countries, NATO allies and strategic economic partners. A smaller, high-quality diplomatic service would be developed progressively, concentrating resources where Scottish interests are greatest. Transitional consular arrangements would be sought so that citizens are not left uncovered while capacity is built.

6.6 Treaty succession

A newly independent Scotland is not automatically bound by all UK treaties and does not automatically succeed to them. It would review the treaty stock, notify succession to the multilateral treaties it wishes to continue, and negotiate new or revised bilateral agreements where necessary. Critical treaties on human rights, aviation, climate, extradition and other essential functions would be prioritised for early continuity or succession. A systematic review and notification process would be established as part of the transition. Continuity where it matters; independent choice where it counts.

6.7 International development / overseas aid policy

Scotland would establish its own international development policy and aid programme, shaped by Scottish priorities and values. The Scottish Parliament would decide the spending target, commonly expressed as a share of national income. The programme would focus on areas of Scottish expertise and comparative advantage, and would operate with full transparency and independent evaluation. The wider assets-and-liabilities settlement would address existing UK aid commitments relating to Scotland. Aid sits inside the fiscal rules; it is not an automatic continuation of UK levels or an exempt category above domestic prioritisation.

Taken together, these seven positions define a coherent external posture: no application to join the EU; WTO baseline and selective agreements; membership of the core multilateral organisations; focused recognition and diplomacy; managed treaty succession; and an aid policy Scotland owns and can afford to run properly.

The package rejects two failures at once — transferring hard-won powers to Brussels under the label of independence, and isolation from practical international cooperation. It depends on institutional capacity, fiscal honesty about subscriptions and aid envelopes, and UK cooperation on recognition and residual settlement issues. Those are standard tasks of state formation. Decision-making power remains in Holyrood. Relationships with the EU, the rest of the UK, and the wider world are built by a sovereign state choosing its partners, not by a jurisdiction seeking a new centre of external control.